For Paul Maritz, one of the top executives at Microsoft Corp., the day must have resembled a trip to the dentist. During relentless prodding by the Justice Dept.'s lead attorney, Maritz reluctantly conceded that Microsoft feared that the rival browser made by Netscape Communications Corp. could one day become a "platform" for software developers and possibly threaten the software giant's control of operating systems.

Even more reluctantly, Maritz admitted on Jan. 26 that at a meeting on June 21, 1995, Microsoft hoped to persuade Netscape executives to build its products on top of Microsoft's Windows technology and to cede all control of the key Internet code to Microsoft. That, according to Justice, would make it impossible for Netscape to operate independently in the platform market and potentially topple Windows. In return, Microsoft would offer to help Netscape develop its products in higher-end software and in servers, which run on network computers.

But these admissions didn't come easy. In a courtroom version of pulling teeth, the government's lead litigator, David Boies, pursued Maritz until he conceded a major point -- though it was in a veiled way. After an extended back and forth between Boies and Maritz, U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson intervened, warning Maritz to answer with a yes, no, or neutral to Boies's question of whether "Microsoft was offering to do stuff for Netscape in order to make them less of a platform" threat. To which Maritz answered, "Yes." He added, though, that the two sides "discussed what makes sense for them and what would make sense for us."

Later Maritz answered "yes" again when Boies asked whether Microsoft was trying to persuade Netscape to use Windows technology and that the "more they use Window technology in their browser, the less the browser could be used as a platform competitive to Windows."

"AVOID HOT AND COLD WAR." Some of the interchanges were telling, but hard to parse. "Were you not trying to convince Netscape to cede control of Internet APIs?" Boies asked. (APIs are application program interfaces, which software developers use to write programs to a specific operating system.) Maritz answered that Microsoft wanted to make sure "they were using technology that could be exploited by Windows."

Boies offered up some internal E-mail as evidence that Microsoft wanted to divide markets--moving Netscape out of the Windows market altogether. In a June 1, 1995, memo, a senior Microsoft executive wrote that one of its "working goals" was to "move Netscape out of the Win32 Internet client arena." (Client is another word for browser). The memo goes on to say that "we want to close a deal with Netscape" that would give them non-Windows markets, such as the Apple Macintosh and the Unix operating system. In another memo, executive Daniel Rosen wrote that "our goal should be to wrest leadership of the client evolution from them." Still another: "Avoid hot and cold war with Netscape, Keep them from sabotaging our platform evolution."

Maritz, Microsoft's group vice-president for platforms and applications and the most senior Microsoft executive to testify in the antitrust trial, argued that the goal was to come up with ways to help both companies. He said that Microsoft wanted Netscape to leave the nuts and bolts of Internet browser technology and instead focus on more developed and complicated Internet applications.

Further, Maritz said that the proposal could not be described as negative from Netscape's point of view -- even though it might temporarily keep them from developing a competitive platform. He said that Netscape could take the money it saves from not building features that duplicate those in Windows and use it to take on Microsoft in other areas, such as corporate markets. Boies dismissed this characterization as wishful thinking on the part of Microsoft.

SPLIT THE BROWSER? The government also scored some points on its contention that Microsoft embedded its Internet browser into Windows with the aim of harming Netscape's rival product. Microsoft argues that Windows 98 is a single product and that the browser cannot be removed without degrading the operating system.

But Justice offered up a few internal Microsoft E-mail messages showing that some company officials were proposing that some pieces of the browser be removed and sold separately as part of the Windows 98 upgrade. Responding to these proposals, Maritz noted in a July, 1997, E-mail: "It's tempting, but we have to remember that getting browser share up to 50% (or more) is still the major goal."

Justice officials were trying to show that some company officials believed it was possible to split the browser -- or at least parts of it -- and charge separately for it. Under cross-examination, Maritz said that this proposal came from marketing officials who wanted to "increase the value of the Windows 98 upgrade." He said that he rejected it: "You don't want to reengineer a product" when it's about to be released.

That answer didn't satisfy Judge Jackson, who pressed Maritz on the reasons why he preferred to keep the browser intact. "You wanted to ship as an integrated product," the judge noted, and the "the primary objective was to increase browser share."

By David McDonough