APRIL 10, 2003
WAR IN IRAQ -- COMMENTARY
By Stan Crock
Two Myths of the Iraq War | Troop strength wasn't too light for the job, nor is Bush the kind of unilateralist Lone Ranger many of his critics make him out to be
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With Saddam Hussein statues selling at a deep discount in the Baghdad souk, the war is all but over. Perhaps it's time to puncture two of the myths that arose during the three-week operation -- one military, the other diplomatic.
The military myth said U.S. forces were too light. A constant refrain from the former generals and majors on TV was that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was trying out his theory of an air-dominated war with a lighter, faster, and more lethal ground force, and it wasn't working, as unprotected supply lines were stretched hundreds of miles. Viewed as a snapshot of a war in progress, the criticism had credence at the time. But taken from a longer view, the military presence could actually be considered heavy.
THEN AND NOW. Let's look at the strength of the forces assembled for Operation Iraqi Freedom compared with Desert Storm of 12 years ago: 250,000 U.S. troops on the ground today, vs. 550,000 then. Remember, Baghdad lost close to half its combat effectiveness in Desert Storm as tanks were blown up and soldiers killed. And U.N. sanctions on Iraq meant few imports of spare parts or arms over the years that followed.
On that basis alone, 250,000 troops would be enough. But in Desert Storm, 10% of munitions were precision-guided, while in Iraqi Freedom, the figure was closer to 70%, and tanks were far more accurate. So, in theory, far fewer than 250,000 should have been necessary.
Of course, taking over Iraq was harder than ousting Saddam's troops from Kuwait. On balance, the 250,000 U.S. troops probably represented just as heavy a force as that fielded in Desert Storm. Indeed, General Tommy Franks initially sought five divisions -- or about 75,000 front-line troops -- and that's what he got.
PAYBACK TIME. Sure, Rumsfeld got his special forces folks in and tried strategic bombing at the beginning. But this was hardly the test of a novel war plan. The major difference between Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom was that communications linked the forces in ways that enabled them to do what they've always done, but better. That's important, but not exactly revolutionary.
So what was all the fuss about? My own theory is that it was partly payback for Rumsfeld's treatment of the Army. He undermined Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki by naming the general's successor while Shinseki still had plenty of time left in his position. Rumsfeld also has made clear he thinks the Army is too heavy, immobile, and conventional, and he gives no credit to Shinseki and others for the innovations they have sponsored (see BW Online, 4/10/03, "'If You Cannot Be Loved, Be Feared'").
Yet, if the military were really so flat-footed, it couldn't have retooled and retrenched as well as it did during battle. It's always tough to plan, even for the best-case scenario. You adjust as you go. The Army adjusted well.
OVERBLOWN IMAGE. Now, Rumsfeld may have a harder time cutting ground forces in future budgets. But the dirty secret is that this will simply help the services blunt the drive for transformation Rumsfeld supposedly initiated when he became Defense Secretary three years ago.
The truth is, Rummy's image as a gung-ho revolutionary is overblown. The big cheerleader for transformation was Richard Armitage, who ended up at the State Dept., not the Pentagon. Former Senator Dan Coats (R-Ind.), who was supposed to be Defense Secretary, also was a champion of a military overhaul, but he didn't get the job either. Rumsfeld had no stake in the issue -- or much knowledge about it -- when he assumed his post.
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Copyright 2003, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved.
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