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SEPTEMBER 2, 2003
By Alex Salkever "We've Made Bad Security Tradeoffs" Author Bruce Schneier discusses why the Patriot Act and other anti-terror measures mean "giving up a lot -- and not getting very much" Bruce Schneier is a rare creature in the computer-security world. Although he made his name as an alpha geek in cryptography and later, as chief technology officer of Net-security outfit Counterpane, Schneier can also speak to laypeople about the general security matters that increasingly touch all of our lives. In the post September 11 era, he has emerged as one of the more cogent and quotable thinkers on the topic. In particular, he has asked hard questions about the effectiveness of some of the security measures passed after the terrorists' massacre. Schneier's latest book, Beyond Fear (Copernicus Books, 2003), is a highly readable compendium of his thoughts on the various aspects of real-world security. Designed for a general audience, it's a great introduction to a complicated and confusing topic. I interviewed Schneier via e-mail over the week of Aug. 25. Here are edited excerpts of our exchange: Q: Beyond Fear is about taking a sensible approach to security. What compelled you to write it? And why do we need a book like this right now? A: I wrote this book to try to inject some sense into the security debate. So much of the dialog of security centers around fear and uncertainty. I wanted both to explain how security really works and to show how we all can make ourselves safer by thinking of security not in absolutes but in terms of tradeoffs. There's so much stupid security out there -- in airports, in office buildings, in the government. I wanted to give people the ability to see why some things are stupid and -- to the extent possible -- how to fix them. There are many dangers in the world, both real and perceived, and it's my hope that the book gives people a realistic sense of how to deal with risks and threats. Q: You have been critical of efforts to better secure the U.S. and the world in the wake of September 11. What do you think are the biggest mistakes we've made in those efforts? A: I think the biggest mistake is that we've made policy decisions while scared. We've passed laws that are expensive, both in terms of money and fundamental liberties, without giving us a corresponding increase in actual security. In other words, we've made bad security tradeoffs. Q: You argue that people and not technology are what will make us more secure. What are some ways we could use people more effectively? A: People have an innate sense of risk. It's a product of millions of years of evolution. The best things the U.S. has done to combat terrorism have involved people -- investigating terrorist activities, interdicting terrorist funding, prohibiting terrorist movement, and arresting terrorist leaders. These actions have done more to increase our security than any "improvements" in airline security. We need to invest in these sorts of people initiatives if we're going to make a difference. Q: What are some of the ways we're misusing technology in hopes of providing better security? A: We're relying too much on it. There's a widespread belief that technology can somehow solve our security problems. Federal initiatives like TIA [Total Information Awareness] and CAPPS-2 [Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System] have promised to pick terrorists out of a sea of nonterrorists. I spend a lot of time in my book explaining why it just isn't true. And slowly, we're learning. A couple of years ago, Tampa became the first city to install cameras and face-recognition technology, with the idea of picking criminals out of crowds. Last month, the city scrapped the system, after spending millions and arresting nobody. It was a complete waste of money.
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