Living With IPO Regrets
You can always go private again. Third in a series
New Horizon Kids Quest, a Plymouth (Minn.) operator of children's
entertainment centers at casinos, had pizzazz when it went public back
in 1995. Its centers were linked to the hot casino market and had potential
to break into other fields. The stock came out at $5 and, in 1996, shot up
to $12.25.
Partly to keep control, the company sold only $5 million in shares -- half of
what institutional investors consider the minimum for a company's shares
to be liquid and their price representative of company value. When the
gaming industry slowed, the stock fizzled. New Horizon Kids Quest has been around $2.50
recently. Now its founders have regrets. "I think we were pretty naïve
and didn't realize that without institutional investment, the stock has
a harder time creeping to where it needs to be and be stable," says Sue
Dunkley, president.
New Horizon Kids made a classic mistake of entrepreneurs who take their businesses public. The reflex to keep as much of the company as you can may be appropriate
for a closely held concern. But in the public arena, you have a commitment
to make your company a good investment for anyone -- not just people who
are personally devoted to it. And that requires offering enough shares
to create a genuine market.
MobiNetix, a Sunnyvale (Calif.) maker of touch-screen terminals for
customer transactions, also has a small float, stemming from its 1996 reverse
acquisition, an often-criticized strategy in which a private company merges
with a public shell. Company officials thought this would cost less than
an IPO and help MobiNetix' simultaneous drive to raise private, preferred
equity, because private investors would be able to convert their stakes
into tradeable common stock. The company raised $6 million in preferred
equity. It then needed to register the preferred shares with the U.S. Securities
& Exchange Commission, so that they could be converted to common stock
under the new company structure. Registration, which is automatic in an
IPO, required an audit of the company's results for the previous three
years at a cost of some $500,000. But MobiNetix did not receive the proceeds
of the private equity sale from investors in time to complete the registration.
As a result, the company had a float of only 200,000 shares (from both
old and new shareholders), no analyst coverage, and wasn't able to graduate
to a Nasdaq listing. The company trades on the OTC Bulletin Board, as did
the shell company. Consequently, it still doesn't have real access to public
capital. "OTC Bulletin Board is not conducive to doing additional public
offerings," says Jeffrey Krauss, general partner at Nazem & Co. in
New York, a venture-capital firm and one of MobiNetix' preferred
shareholders. "So they have not had the ease of access to capital in the
way that other growth companies have."
Since 1996, MobiNetix has raised an additional $7 million through private
placements. But raising private money involves extensive research and
face-to-face negotiations every time. And now, the company has the baggage
of being public. "If we had a bigger float [with some conversions
of private stock, it's grown to about 550,000 shares], at least we could
raise money at a better price and a fairer valuation," CEO Aziz Valliani
says. MobiNetix has been relatively lucky. It has successfully raised funds
from preferred investors, who -- so far -- haven't insisted that the company
spend precious resources on registering their shares.
IPO WOES. Going public too soon sets up expectations that many young companies
can't meet. They try to grow too fast and risk failing in the attempt --
putting a viable business in crisis. When Christopher Ljungkull's Legal Research Center in Minneapolis sought $700,000 in financing in 1995, an investment banker
offered to take it public with a larger offering. The research service,
which had $1.2 million in revenue in 1994, expanded its strategic plan
and raised nearly $5 million. But it wasn't enough to finance a costly
new Internet-related operation, which was shut down last year. The stock
price withered to around 30 cents a share earlier this year as the company
restructured. Ljungkull concedes: "We should have started with a smaller
private offering, then gone public."
So what's a small company with IPO regrets to do? Some may go private
again, buying the shares back. Most entrepreneurs interviewed believe that
over time, if they build the business and then develop investor relations,
the stock will follow. "The key is you have to stay focused on the business,
and hopefully the stock will respond. This is not the end of the story
for us," says Robert Soloff, CEO of Sonics & Materials in Newtown,
Conn., which recently turned a profit in its fiscal first quarter
after a fourth-quarter loss. (See the previous stories in this series.)
But the experience of Jeremy Barbera, CEO of Marketing
Services Group in New York, suggests the wait may be long. He more than tripled the
company's revenue, to $80 million, in 1996 with three acquisitions. He even
got GE Capital to invest. But with the stock at $2.50, investment
bank analysts won't track it, the key to luring new institutional investors.
"It's a horrible Catch-22," says Barbera. "It's like getting your first
credit card. But we'll get past it because of these acquisitions we're
doing."
Sure, there are some benefits of being public even without a soaring
price -- more financing alternatives, the discipline of disclosure,
and the cachet. The problem is that you can't fully reap those benefits
if you can't satisfy your company's new co-owners -- the public. "Doing
the reverse merger was not the best thing for the company, because it didn't
give the shareholders the liquidity they wanted," concedes the CFO David Licurse of MobiNetix. The company is weighing alternatives: to register its private equity to convert it to common shares, to try a secondary offering despite the low valuation,
or to go private with the intent of going public via an IPO. Those are tough
choices.
Like many small companies, MobiNetix has discovered the hard way that
the market is a cruel master -- and it gives its lessons in public.
By Hilary Rosenberg in New York
To: FINANCE
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