Airline Safety: A Whistleblower's Tale

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Several safety inspectors interviewed by BusinessWeek said the pressure not to impose big expenses on the carriers increased after the September 11 terrorist attacks, which threw the airline industry into an economic tailspin. They said that this led to a decrease in the reporting of safety violations. In the six-year period following September 11, 2001, the number of so-called enforcement investigation reports (EIRs) filed for the six biggest airlines fell by 62%, to 1,480, compared with the prior six-year period, according to FAA data reviewed by BusinessWeek. The number of domestic passengers grew by about 42% during this same period.

The decline in EIRs "begs for some type of congressional oversight and inquiry," says Jim Hall, former chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board. "The numbers, as they stand alone, are alarming."

The FAA argues that there is no cause for concern. The agency notes that the fatal accident rate has steadily declined over the past decade, and it disputes many of the factual allegations and criticisms leveled by Lund, Hall, the IG, and other flight inspectors interviewed by BusinessWeek. The FAA says that all of the safety issues raised by Lund during the Northwest strike were appropriately investigated, and that the public was never in any danger. It adds that airlines have no power to retaliate against inspectors. "The FAA listens to our inspectors and expects them to investigate all potential safety risks," the agency wrote in response to questions posed by BusinessWeek.

Northwest says that it did not retaliate against Lund, that passengers were never in danger during the 2005 strike, and that it performed appropriate maintenance on every flight during that period, including the one with the broken lavatory duct. The company adds that its training program has always exceeded FAA standards. "Northwest's safety record during this period was unblemished," says Roman Blahoski, media relations manager for Northwest Airlines. "It has always been the policy of Northwest to maintain a collaborative and professional relationship with all of the government agencies that oversee us; this includes the FAA."

"I'll Stop the Airplane" There's little doubt that Lund rubs some people the wrong way. He knows the agency's thick rule book almost by heart, and he interprets it strictly. "Mark stands up and speaks the truth," says fellow inspector Mike Gonzales, who works in Scottsdale, Ariz. "Some people, including even his colleagues, don't like him for that." Another colleague called him "dogmatic" and "hard to like." Before joining the FAA in 1990 Lund worked as an aircraft electrician for the U.S. Navy and as maintenance director for a small airline in Minneapolis. He makes no apologies for his sometimes abrasive personality. "I'm here to keep the public safe," says Lund, who is an official in the local PASS union. If a concern arises, "I'll stop the airplane, and I'll watch every step."

Lund worked in Bloomington, Minn., at the FAA office responsible for supervising Northwest Airlines. In FAA-speak, it was a certificate management office. It had about 60 inspectors and was overseen by the FAA's regional headquarters in Chicago. By the time of the 2005 strike, Northwest had already sent a file of complaints about Lund to Chicago "going back many years," according to the IG report.

Lund claims that most of the airline's complaints arose when he delayed planes. In 1993 Lund prevented five

DC-10s from taking off because Northwest had not repaired passenger-seat defects that would cause them to come apart in a crash. "The paperwork had been signed off, but we found that they had not been repaired properly," Lund told BusinessWeek. He claims that Northwest pressured his bosses, who in turn told him to return to the office and assured him that the airline would fix the problem. "I'm sure they took care of it," he said. "But we have no verification."

While inspecting a Northwest 747 in 1994, Lund discovered that when its oxygen masks dropped in an emergency they were dangling two feet above the head of a typical passenger. That made the masks useless. He stopped the airplane until the problem was fixed. "The carrier went ballistic," said a Northwest Airlines FAA inspector with direct knowledge of the matter. Northwest declined to comment on these incidents.

Once the 2005 strike got under way, Lund and his fellow inspectors established 24-hour-a-day surveillance of Northwest's 4,400 replacement mechanics. Inspectors met with their supervisors every day to discuss potential safety issues. But according to Lund, FAA managers ignored inspectors' warnings. Lund came to the conclusion that he had only one option: to file the special safety recommendation report, which is the only method FAA inspectors have to raise safety concerns without having their words potentially edited by supervisors. The FAA says it "thoroughly investigated" Lund's concerns.