"As close as lips and teeth." That once-popular phrase can no longer be used to describe China's decades-old close fraternal Communist relationship with North Korea. With Pyongyang's nuclear test on Oct. 9, it looks increasingly as if Beijing will have to jettison its longtime go-soft approach with its trouble-making neighbor and adopt a much tougher, confrontational stance.
"The DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] ignored universal opposition of the international community and flagrantly conducted the nuclear test on Oct. 9," China's foreign ministry said in an unusually strongly worded statement released just hours after the test. "The Chinese government is resolutely opposed to it," the ministry added. "China and North Korea's strategic relationship has been totally ruined by the test," says Yan Xuetong, director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University. "There is no more Communist brother relationship between our countries."
But what once was Communist brotherhood, in recent years has been more defined by economic example. Beijing's policy has been to encourage Pyongyang's reclusive leaders to open up their economy more, hoping it would temper their nuclear desires.
SIX-PARTY SILENCE? So at Beijing's urging, North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il made a series of trips—the most recent one in January—to the mainland. On the itinerary: examples of Chinese economic reform success, with visits to Beijing computer maker Lenovo and the Shanghai stock market. But now the effort to sway the reclusive nation by economic reform success stories and by drawing it into the international economy seems badly damaged.
At the same time, Beijing's longtime advocacy of diplomatic means to deal with North Korea's nuclear ambitions, the so-called Six Party Talks between the North, South Korea, Japan, Russia, the U.S., and China, has failed. "It's a big slap to Beijing's previous approach to North Korea," says Zhu Feng, director of the International Security Program at Beijing University. "It's high time for Beijing to find a new approach, basically harsher and tougher."
Clearly, that will involve joining with the rest of the world to condemn North Korea's actions. And although Beijing traditionally has shown an aversion to such censures—it sees them as infringing on national sovereignty—sitting on the sidelines is no longer an option. Beijing already voted to support an earlier United Nations resolution criticizing North Korea for its July 5 missile tests.
STRONGER MEASURES. But this time, Beijing is likely to take a much stronger step—supporting, or at least not voting against, possible U.N. economic sanctions against North Korea. With much of Pyongyang's food and fuel coming from the mainland, this is a move that could hurt. Beijing is well aware that a further blow to the already troubled North Korean economy could cause large numbers of refugees to flood its northeast, an alarming prospect that has made it reluctant to back strong economic sanctions before.
But following the nuclear test, reports are already emerging that Beijing may be planning to at least temporarily halt the transportation of some goods between the two countries at the key border crossing of Dandong in China's northeastern Liaoning province. "If there is a [United Nations] provision to cut off oil or food, China would naturally follow it," predicts Beijing University's Zhu Feng.
By going nuclear despite clear warnings from Beijing, Pyongyang has probably destroyed the last vestiges of what had been a close but increasingly tattered relationship, and may have damaged Beijing's prestige in the region. But far more alarming than that for Beijing is the specter of a nuclear arms race.
WILL ANOTHER FOLLOW? "First thing, we must do something to prevent the nuclear test from rippling across the region," says Zhu. "If Japan uses a nuclear North Korea as an excuse to go nuclear, then South Korea could follow very quickly. Then how about Taiwan? This would do terrible damage to regional stability." Zhu says close collaboration amongst the U.S., Russia, Japan, South Korea, and China is key to avoiding that scary prospect.
That very real fear is driving Beijing toward a new, much more confrontational policy towards Pyongyang. Beijing will have to balance that new stance with its desire to avoid an economic or political meltdown in its now nuclear-armed neighbor. Meanwhile, a key question is how North Korea will respond to a tougher China. The answer to that may well determine stability in Asia and the world for decades to come.
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