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This has not gone unnoticed by ordinary Pakistanis, who have seen their lot deteriorate as the military has enriched itself at their expense. U.S. aid has helped to increase the country's GDP, but a basic education is still not within the reach of most Pakistanis, health care continues to deteriorate, the media is often intimidated, and journalists are often jailed and killed. Emergency rule by the army will do nothing to strengthen business and investor confidence, say expatriate Pakistanis.
Across the border sits India, with its booming economy, robust democratic political systems, and rising middle class, a country on its way to becoming a world power. In Pakistan, the military identified itself with soldiers and the elite feudal classes, ignoring the poor and the middle classes who are the backbone of Pakistani society and make up its intelligentsia.
This middle class, which nurtures civil society groups and yearns for a more equitable, democratic, and independent-acting Pakistan, is now asserting itself. The last six months have seen an astonishing blossoming of that civil society, led by lawyers and the judiciary. The goal: the restitution, to pride of place, of the much-manipulated constitution of the country. The target: Musharraf, who further abused and misused the constitution to stay in power as both President and army commander-in-chief and to suspend the rights of opponents.
The spark was ignited in March, when Pakistan's chief justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, began asking uncomfortable questions about Musharraf's dual position, the quick and cheap sale of state assets, and people missing from their homes after the army conducted random searches across Pakistan. Infuriated, Musharraf asked Chaudhry to resign. The judge's refusal became the rallying point that ordinary Pakistanis needed; hundreds of thousands rose up in support, asking for Musharraf's resignation instead and a return to democratic rule.
It could have worked. A deeply flawed but workable power-sharing agreement with exiled opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, brokered by the U.S., was nearly in the bag. And the Supreme Court, under the popular, reinstated chief justice Chaudhry, had allowed Musharraf to run for reelection—subject to a Nov. 6 hearing on whether he would have to give up his post as army chief. Afraid the public mood for democracy would force him to run for president as a civilian, Musharraf imposed emergency rule. "Let's not kid ourselves that it's an 'emergency'—it's martial law," said Talat Hussain, a popular host on Pakistan's Aaj TV, minutes before Islamabad blacked it off viewers' screens.
Perhaps Musharraf should have stuck to what he knew best, running the army. A shrewd politician would have sensed the national mood and gone with it, instead of against it. But Indian intelligence officials who have studied Musharraf say he is a high-risk gambler, with the luck of the devil. Despite deepening discontent and growing radicalization within the rank and file of the army, Musharraf has hung on to power for nine years, and survived four assassination attempts during that time. The emergency was a calculated risk, and though India immediately deployed additional troops on its western borders, the bets in the bazaar are that Musharraf has a 60% chance of pulling off his audacious, unpopular move.
Certainly those chances will diminish if the U.S. withdraws its military aid from Pakistan, or if the Pakistani army refuses orders to shoot its own countrymen. Already, rumors have surfaced that the vice-chief of army staff, Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Kaini, placed Musharraf under house arrest on Nov. 5, taking over as army chief. The rumors have been denied by Musharraf, but reflect the tensions between him and his army over the declaration of the state of emergency.
Pakistan's fate will be sealed in the next few days. Already, the country is split between pro- and anti-Musharraf groups; many judges in Sindh and Peshawar have refused to swear allegiance to the new chief justice installed by Musharraf. Increased agitation and street protests will be evidence of reduced support for Musharraf from the public and from within his army, and will speed his execution or departure. If he is able to contain the agitation, it will enhance his standing within the army, and ensure a few more years of army rule in Pakistan while effectively silencing democratic voices.
Either way, the U.S. would do well to expand its circle of friends in Pakistan beyond Musharraf and his army—or cast its net wider for another strategic country to be its ally in the war on terror.
Kripalani is BusinessWeek's India bureau chief .