Chinese President Hu Jintao's Apr. 20 visit to the United States has generated much discussion about the present and future state of U.S.-China relations. Critics charge that it's a waste of time to argue over whether to call the tour a "state visit" or what kind of official reception Hu should get as the head of the Chinese state. They worry such trivial things will overshadow more important business in the bilateral relationship. But the devil is in the details, and the details of Washington's handling of the Chinese leader's coming say quite a bit about the U.S. attitude toward a rising China.
President Bush has put many U.S. complaints on the agenda. The U.S. trade deficit with the Middle Kingdom ballooned to a little more than $200 billion in 2005. Beijing is manipulating its currency, and the yuan is undervalued by as much as 40%, some economists contend. Low-priced Chinese goods are flooding the U.S. market, taking away manufacturing jobs. Then there are the huge losses of U.S. revenues in China due to persistent piracy of Western intellectual-property rights.
Finishing off the list are Beijing's close ties with oil-producing countries that pose security and proliferation concerns to Americans, China's spotty human rights record, and the desire for Beijing to play a bigger role in the nuclear deadlock with North Korea and Iran.
The Chinese agenda, by comparison, is less complicated. Beijing wants Washington's reassurance that it opposes Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian's independence plan. China also expects some credit for rolling out the check book in a bid to pacify trade concerns in the U.S. After all, China has agreed to import U.S. beef and medical devices, load all PCs sold in the mainland with legal software, and buy $16.2 billion worth of contracts for Boeing jets, Motorola networking gear, and other U.S. goods.
And above all, the Chinese delegation wants some respect -- and a high-profile reception -- in the U.S. It is important for Hu politically back home, and for the international image of this ascending economic power abroad. The White House, however, is not planning an elaborate diplomatic production compared to the usual standards of big-power summitry. Hu will receive full military honors with a 21-gun salute at his arrival ceremony, but this is not being considered a "state visit" by the Americans.
There will be no formal dinner or state banquet, as Beijing would like. The official excuse may be that President Bush doesn't like formalities, but the real reasons are clear: The Bush Administration does not want to appear to be courting top Chinese while there is strong anti-Chinese sentiment on Capitol Hill and some fear of a rising China among ordinary Americans. It may also reflect that Washington doubts China is really serious about making progress on the range of tough bilateral issues that matter most to the Bush Administration.
The Chinese likely will be bitter about this. After all, Hu hosted a state banquet last year when Bush visited Beijing. To Chinese leaders, the U.S. lack of reciprocity is more than a matter of broken protocol or domestic political bickering. It is seen as a slap in Hu's face. It also cuts to a deeper issue, from Beijing's perspective. It suggests that Washington doesn't fundamentally acknowledge the legitimacy of China's authoritarian Communist government.
China, despite its growing economic clout and changes in other areas, is still a one-party state. The Bush Administration, with all its own problems, still wants to be perceived as a champion for democratic change around the world. So in the U.S. mindset several mutually contradictory images of the rising dragon coexist:
While China is a vast market for U.S. companies, and Washington's deficit spending is made possible by Beijing's continuous purchase of U.S. treasury bills, it is also an economic competitor that may take over the U.S. dominance of world commerce in the near future.
While Beijing is a "stakeholder" in world affairs that may help U.S.