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CONTENTS
Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction and Overview
SECTION 1 Why Capitalism Creates So Few Capitalists
CHAPTER 1 Disconnected Capitalism
CHAPTER 2 Reconstructing Capitalism
CHAPTER 3 Why Does Capitalism Create So Few Capitalists?
CHAPTER 4 Putting the "Own" Back in Ownership
CHAPTER 5 Up-Close Capitalism--The Employee Ownership
Solution
CHAPTER 6 New Property Paradigms
CHAPTER 7 Toward a Workable Work Ethic
CHAPTER 8 Reinventing Labor Unions
SECTION 2 A Capitalism That Works for Everyone
CHAPTER 9 Making Money
CHAPTER 10 Capitalism as if Our Children Mattered
CHAPTER 11 Community Without the Communism
CHAPTER 12 The Politics of Ownership
SECTION 3 Toward a Twenty-First-Century Capitalism
CHAPTER 13 Reinventing Capitalism
CHAPTER 14 Reengineering Capitalism for Inclusion
CHAPTER 15 Creating a Capitalism That Creates More
Capitalists
SECTION 4 Coping with Global Capitalism
CHAPTER 16 The Development Dilemma
CHAPTER 17 Reinventing Capitalism in Europe
CHAPTER 18 Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics
CHAPTER 19 Latin America, the Caribbean and the Catholic
Church
CHAPTER 20 South Africa: Overcoming Economic Apartheid
CHAPTER 21 Islamic Ownership: The Vice-Regents
Epilogue
Appendix A Making Assets Accountable
Appendix B Dissecting Modern Ownership
Appendix C Core Ingredients in Any Ownership Solution
Appendix D GDP--What Gets Measured Gets Managed
Notes
Index
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The Ownership Solution
Toward a Shared Capitalism for the Twenty-First Century
By Jeff Gates
Addison-Wesley
(C) 1998 Jeffrey R. Gates
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 0-201-32808-9
Read BW's Review of This Book
CHAPTER ONE
Disconnected Capitalism
If we do not change our direction, we are likely to end up
where we are going.
--Chinese proverb
For the first time in human history, a single economic system encircles
the globe. This global capitalism is both good news and bad. The good
news is that more so than ever before, capitalism has proven its capacity
to produce untold riches. The bad news is that many people are now
victimized by forces seemingly beyond their control, including an ongoing
globalization of finance that benefits the few while marginalizing the
many. Those same forces could be harnessed to the advantage of everyone,
but this will come about only if, as and when more of us become connected
to capitalism--as capitalists.
As the world's largest market economy, the United States provides a
dramatic example of how modern capitalism is rapidly becoming
"disconnected" from those who live in its midst. America's institutional
investors--pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, banks,
foundations and university endowments--held $11,100,000,000,000 ($11.1
trillion) in assets as of 1 July 1996. Due to the booming stock market,
those holdings doubtless crossed the $12 trillion threshold by early 1998.
Fidelity Management and Research Company oversees more than $600
billion in assets; Boston's State Street Bank manages $300 billion. The
December 1997 announcement of a merger between Union Bank of Switzerland
and the Swiss Bank Corporation was the first sign of what is likely to be
a series of megamergers that reflect the structural changes sweeping
global capital markets. It not only created the world's second largest
bank with $595 billion in assets; it also created a money management
behemoth with $920 billion in assets. Worldwide, the top half-dozen
investment managers now direct $3.5 trillion in combined assets. These
are the equivalent J. P. Morgans, Pilkingtons and Krupps of today, but
with a key difference: where those legendary "silk hat" capitalists were
hands-on managers both of companies and the financial capital those
companies represented, today's megacapitalists manage only one
thing--money. Money management focused on maximizing financial returns
is not new. What is new is the vast scale and the skyrocketing growth of
contemporary "disconnected" capital. Institutional assets totaled just
$673 billion in 1970 and still only $1.9 trillion by 1980. For the next
ten years, all American will turn age fifty every seven seconds. Aging
baby boomers (born between 1946 and 1964) ensure a continued growth in
retirement savings, along with a steady flow of funds into institutional
hands.
What is also new is the enormous deference granted the information
reflected in financial returns, especially when one considers how
dramatically people's lives are affected by the decisions based on those
numbers. To an alarming extent, short-term share prices are the compass by
which the course is set. The result is a sort of secular sanctification
of market forces, with the result that these vast sums are invested to
reflect only those values contained within a very narrow band of very
specialized feedback. This preference for financial indicators, in turn,
neglects the impact this capital has on many other key indicators of
economic and social health.
Those include the nation's social structure, including the steadily
widening gap between rich and poor; the environment (financial data
inadequately signals ecological costs that are distant in time and
place); and the steadily growing number of households left out of this
wealth accumulation process altogether
who, in turn, become dependent on government support. This escalating
dependency, in turn, imperils the nation's fiscal health as claims for
support (income, services, public-sector jobs, etc.) "crowd out" budget
resources essential to the general welfare, including funds needed for
education, health, infrastructure and the cleanup and restoration of the
environment.
This trend toward institutionalized, disconnected capital is gaining
momentum worldwide as governments privatize state-run pension plans and
enhance incentives for retirement savings. One school of experts sees
this trend contributing both to development and political stability as
growing pools of capital support dynamic "emerging markets" worldwide.
These analysts foresee a steady lessening in the vulnerability of developing
countries to the whims of foreign investors and the volatility of quick-trigger
capital flows. Others worry that the dictates of financial capital will
diminish both the will and the means for societies to pursue fundamental
notions of equity, dignity and individual self-realization. While
experts disagree on the impact of this trend,
there is little disagreement on one key feature of the trend itself: the
ongoing concentration of wealth in the hands of either the already-rich
or institutions.
The Widening Gap Between the Haves and the Have-Nots
Between 1980 and 1992, total assets in the United States increased nearly
threefold while institutional assets grew 4.5 times. By mid-1997, American
mutual funds held $4.0 trillion, almost six times the total of just a decade
earlier. While it's true that more American adults own stocks and stock
mutual funds than at any time in history (51.3 million in 1995), 71
percent of households own no shares at all or hold less than $2,000 in
any form, including mutual funds, popular 401(k) plans and traditional
pensions, according to a 1995 study by M.I.T. economist James M. Poterba
and Dartmouth economist Andrew A. Samwick.
Though stories of "401(k) millionaires" abound, such individuals are a
rarity. For instance, a mid-1997 survey of the records at one fund group,
T. Rowe Price Associates Inc. in Baltimore, found just 308 millionaires
among their seven hundred thousand company-sponsored retirement accounts
(i.e., four-hundredths of 1 percent). Even though the United States now
has 2.7 millionaires in a 1996 population of 265 million (1 percent), it
would be a mistake to conclude that wealth ownership is broadening in any
appreciable way. Indeed, surveys suggest quite the opposite. For example,
* Research by Harvard University economic historians found that the
share of the nation's overall net worth held by the wealthiest 1 percent
of American households jumped from below 20 percent in 1979 to more than
36 percent in 1989.
* Although the national net worth expanded $5 trillion from 1983 to 1989,
New York University professor Ed Wolff found that 54 percent of that was
claimed by the half million families who make up the top one-half of 1
percent of the U.S. population. That works out to an average $5.4 million
gain per already-wealthy household. That's three-quarters of a million
dollars each year, $65,000 per month, or $90 per hour, twenty-four hours
a day. And that's when the Dow-Jones industrial average was a fraction of
what it is today.
* Research by scholars at the Federal Reserve and the Internal Revenue
Service found that the net worth of that top 1 percent is now greater
than that of the bottom 90 percent.
* Professor Wolff characterizes the current era as the most extreme
level of wealth concentration since the late 1920s. Census Bureau data
(1996) confirm that impression, documenting that the gap between
America's haves and have-nots is the widest since the end of World War II.
Those who own financial capital also benefited disproportionately from
a record-breaking inflow of funds into the stock market, due in
substantial part to more funds (dominantly baby-boomer retirement
savings) chasing a relatively limited number of securities. That fueled a
steady increase in share values far higher than what could be justified
by underlying economic activity. For instance, following the stock market
"correction" of October 1987 (when
the Dow-Jones industrial average fell from 2,700 to 1,700), the Dow index
climbed to 5,000 by November 1995 and soared beyond 8,000 by mid-1997. In
other words, according to financial market reckoning, the value of these
companies more than quadrupled in less than a decade.
Accompanying this steady increase in wealth concentration was a steady
increase in income disparities:
* According to the Congressional Budget Office, the top 1 percent of U.S.
households claimed 70 percent of the total $250 billion net increase in
household income during the 1977-1989 period.
* The Census Bureau reported in 1996 record levels of inequality, with
the top fifth of American households now claiming 48.2 percent of the
nation's income while the bottom fifth gets by on just 3.6 percent.
* Though average household income climbed 10 percent between 1979 and
1994, 97 percent of that gain was claimed by the most well-to-do 20
percent. In 1973, the income of the top 20 percent of American families
was 7.5 times that of the bottom 20 percent. By 1996, it was more than 13
times.
* Between 1989 and 1993, median household income in the United States
fell more than 7 percent after correcting for family size and inflation.
Recent data suggest that this erosion is accelerating. After adjusting
for inflation, the annual income of households in the lowest quintile
rose only $87 from 1975 to 1994, while the median wage is nearly 3
percent below what it was in 1979. For those in the bottom tenth
percentile--someone earning just above the minimum wage--their
inflation-adjusted wages fell by an astounding 16 percent between 1979
and 1989. Three-quarters of Americans have weathered two decades of
stagnant living standards.
* Meanwhile, income tax returns for 1995 show that 87,000 Americans
reported adjusted gross income of $1 million or more. This upper-upper
income group's income soared 25 percent from 1994 to $227.6 billion,
outpacing the overall 7 percent increase in income reported for the
nation's 118.2 million individual returns.
These trends led William McDonough, chairman of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, to issue a strongly worded caution: "Issues of equity
and social cohesion [are] issues that affect the very temperament of the
country. We are forced to face the question of whether we will be able
to go forward together as a unified society with a confident outlook or
as a society of diverse economic groups suspicious of both the future and
each other." M.I.T. economist Lester Thurow shares that concern,
cautioning that we have entered a realm where "[T]he system that has held
democracy and capitalism together for the last century has started to
unravel.
Two-Tier Markets for a Two-Tier Society
The marketplace is fundamentally indifferent to this record-breaking
inequality in wealth and income. Retailers have adjusted to this social
polarization by turning to a "Tiffany/Kmart" marketing strategy that
tailors their products and pitches to two very different Americas.
Saatchi & Saatchi Advertising Worldwide warns its clients of "a
continuing erosion of our traditional mass market--the middle class,"
while Paine Webber Inc. cautions investors to "avoid companies that cater
to the `middle' of the consumer market." In 1997, both Kmart and Tiffany
reported earning surges while the midscale chains such as J. C. Penney
suffered.
This dual society means that separate and decidedly unequal markets
are becoming the norm, such as private banking for the well-to-do
alongside record levels of check-cashing outlets (the number of Americans
without checking accounts has surged from 9 percent to 13 percent since
1977). The United States now has fifty-five hundred check-cashing
outlets, versus less than half that in 1988.
The Gap recently remodeled and expanded its
Banana Republic clothing stores, adding sixty-eight new outlets since
1992. Meanwhile, it created a lower-end chain called Old Navy, opening
two hundred outlets since 1993 (compared with just twenty-one new
middle-income Gap outlets).
This phenomenon cuts across industries. The top-earning 20 percent of
Americans now account for 54 percent of new-car sales, up from 40 percent
in 1980. Meanwhile, since 1994 growth in the "secondhand" industry has
tripled the pace of more traditional retail sales. Used-car sales are at
record levels. Pawnshop activity is booming. Prepaid phone cards have
become a must for those who cannot afford their own telephone. This trend
is poised to accelerate. The Atlanta-based Affluent Market Institute
predicts that by 2005 America's millionaires will control 60 percent of
the nation's purchasing dollars. Sales of high-end luxury yachts are
already at record levels.
The Index of Social Well-Being is at a twenty-five-year low. Working
with research dating back to 1970, Fordham University's Institute for
Social Policy annually compares government statistics on sixteen
troublesome topics such as teen suicide, children in poverty and the gap
between rich and poor. The nation's best year was 1973 when (on a scale
of 100) the index stood at 77.5. In the Nixon-Ford era, the index
averaged 73. Under President Carter, it fell to 60. Under President
Reagan it plummeted to 43, and to 40 under George Bush, where it has
since stabilized. Noting that the index has dropped steadily since its
inception, Institute Director Marc L. Miringoff concludes: "Despite a
range of stated differences in philosophy and policy, neither political
party has been able to achieve significant progress in social health over
25 years."
UN Assessment: "World Heads for Grotesque Inequalities"
A worldwide widening of disparities in wealth and income led the United
Nations Development Program to conclude in 1996 that the world is heading
for "grotesque inequalities," noting that "100 countries are worse off
today than 15 years ago." According to UN figures, the poorest 20 percent
of the world's people saw their share of global income decline from 2.3
percent to 1.4 percent over the past thirty years. Meanwhile, among the
world's 5.7 billion people, the top 20 percent hold 83 percent of
worldwide wealth. While global GNP grew 40 percent between 1970 and 1985
(suggesting widening prosperity), the number of poor grew by 17 percent.
Although 200 million people saw their incomes fall between 1965 and 1980,
more than 1 billion people experienced a drop from 1980 to 1993. In
sub-Saharan Africa, twenty countries remain below their per capita
incomes of two decades ago. Among Latin American and Caribbean countries,
eighteen are below their per capita incomes of ten years ago. Even
within the developed countries, more than 100 million people live below
national poverty standards and more than 5 million are homeless.
Meanwhile, the UN reported in 1996 that the assets held by the world's
358 billionaires now exceed the combined incomes of countries with 45
percent of the world's people. These findings led UN development experts
to conclude "Development that perpetuates today's inequalities is neither
sustainable nor worth sustaining" (emphasis added). This pattern--pockets
of prosperity alongside widespread deprivation--has become the worldwide
trend both within and among nations. Over the past thirty years, those
countries that are home to the richest 20 percent of the world's people
increased their share of gross world product from 70 percent to 85
percent. Three decades ago, the people in these well-to-do countries
were thirty times better off than those in countries where the poorest 20
percent of the world's people live. This gap has since more than doubled
(to sixty-one times) and is certain to widen further. The UN offers the
most dramatic assessment, concluding that, if this rich-poor divide
continues, it will produce a world "gargantuan in its excesses and
grotesque in its human and economic inequalities."
Chronicling the Cost of Economic Disparity
This global growth in economic disparity and "disconnectedness" creates
an array of challenges to the health of entire nations and, indeed, to
global capitalism. Mexico evidenced an early symptom in the armed
uprising of the "Zapatistas" on New Year's Day 1994 in impoverished
Chiapas state, home to one-third of Mexico's population though host to 70
percent of its extreme poor, its highest illiteracy rate (60 percent) and
childhood mortality rate (46 percent) and its lowest life expectancy (35
years for women, 45 for men). Similarly, in the Islamic world, the shift
to fundamentalism and occasional extremism is fueled, in part, by those
concerned about steadily worsening poverty and fast-accelerating economic
disparities. Yet the Islam-phobic West points to fundamentalist fervor as
the cause rather than a symptom of discontent.
Frances Moore Lappe, author of Diet for a Small Planet, documents the
correlation between concentrated ownership in agrarian economies and the
high incidence of hunger, malnutrition and infant mortality. In Latin
America, for instance, large landowners are notorious for allowing vast
stretches of arable acreage to lie fallow while landless peasants eke out
a hardscrabble existence. She cites a Central American study where only
14 percent of the land held by the largest landowners was under
cultivation. A UN study of eighty-three nations found that 5 percent of
rural landholders controlled three-quarters of the land. Reflecting a
common pattern, a mid-1980s study disclosed that six families in El
Salvador controlled as much land as three hundred thousand peasants.
In the United States, the most obvious challenge is the ongoing
deterioration in social cohesiveness and the erosion in civil society,
made worse by the fast-growing economic separation between the haves and
have-nots. Fully one-third of American men between the ages of
twenty-five and thirty-four do not earn enough to keep a family of four
out of poverty, with all that implies for the strains on marriage and the
prospects for young families. This growing rift is also racial. The
Census Bureau found in 1991 that the meager median wealth of white
households is eight times that of Hispanic households and ten times that
of African-American households.
Based on a 1995 survey, the Federal Reserve found that the typical
American family had a net worth of $56,400, including home equity, down
from $56,500 six years earlier. This ever widening gap has well-known
social and political implications. Two-tier societies and two-tier
marketplaces are not the fertile ground in which robust democracies take
root. Historians have long documented the threat posed to open political
systems by extreme disparities in wealth, as the possession of great
wealth by a few confers on their holders inordinate power, which they may
be tempted to use in ways that run counter to the general welfare.
The Trend Accelerates
There remains yet much fuel for a continued widening of this two-class
system. For instance, in order to boost short-term earnings,
corporations can unleash what the Wall Street Journal characterizes as
the "four horsemen of the workplace": (1) downsizing, (2) moving
operations to low-wage countries, (3) increased automation and (4) the
use of temporary workers. Other factors are also at work, including the
growth in demand for high-skilled labor, the
spread of networked computers, immigration, the shift from a
manufacturing to a service economy, flatter tax rates, cutbacks in
assistance to the poor, an increase in single-parent families, a decline
in unionization, an erosion in the value of the minimum wage and the
steady rise in the stock and bond markets (and speculation) in which the
wealthy are disproportionately represented.
Widespread assetlessness and eroding incomes also imply large and
growing fiscal strains. That's because, absent broad-based economic
self-reliance, a nation's citizens tend to look to their government not
only for services they cannot afford but also for income they cannot
generate. For example, absent a major shift in policy, a 1994 Bipartisan
Commission on Entitlements and Tax Reform concluded that outlays for
entitlements (Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid) plus interest on
the national debt will by the year 2012 consume 100 percent of federal
tax receipts. Social Security and Medicare alone cost Americans $591.4
billion in 1996 while other outlays to boost household incomes (such
as military and federal employee pensions) cost an additional $247.5
billion.
That's a single year total of $838.9 billion in income redistribution.
And that's before the retirement needs of the baby boomers begin to kick
in. Also, in January 1998, President Clinton proposed an expansion of
Medicare to those aged 55 to 65. This trend is not limited to the United
States. As wealth disparities have widened within developed economies,
the ratio of public to private spending has grown, on average, from 30
percent of gross domestic product in 1960 to 46 percent in 1997,
belying the notion that the worldwide expansion of free enterprise will
necessarily reduce the size of government. Other countries are also
struggling under the fiscal strains associated with this widespread
assetlessness.
America's hugely regressive Social Security tax (levied on a flat
percentage of payroll) is now the largest single tax paid by most U.S.
taxpayers. For a majority of American workers in private industry, Social
Security entitlements are their only old-age pension. Most revealing of
all, those anticipated payments now represent the most significant
"wealth" for a majority of U.S. households. Thus, in the world's avowedly
most "capitalist" economy, the most important asset for a majority of its
citizens is an assurance that someone else will be taxed on their behalf.
Adding insult to injury, that tax is levied on jobs, the sole link that
most Americans have to their economy. Perhaps most ominous of all:
U.S.-trained economists now advise in-transition socialist countries
worldwide, spreading this suspect ownership formula abroad.
Cracks in the Facade
As I suggest in the introduction, the main "systemic" deficiency in
today's capitalism lies in its faulty "feedback" system. The system is
not engineered--wired, if you will--to anticipate and respond to the needs
of those who populate it. Rather (as we shall see), it is steadily being
rewired to reflect the peculiar dictates of financial capital. It is
useful to recall that the very concept of free enterprise is itself a
feedback notion, a term unknown two centuries ago when Adam Smith opened
The Wealth of Nations with his parable of how the market's "invisible
hand" of voluntary exchange and freely determined prices would assure the
optimum results for its participants.
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest, We
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
History has proven Smith largely correct. The dismal results achieved
in "command economics" (such as the Soviet Union) offer eloquent
testimony to the need for markets. However, two major cracks are
beginning to show in the free-enterprise facade. They share a common
trait: faulty feedback. The first: the bulk of people participating in
free enterprise today are not connected to the system in a fully
appropriate manner. Jobs alone are proving inadequate. For instance,
Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, advised that
Europe's disadvantaged would have to learn to cope with "a whole new
relationship with leisure time" (i.e., unemployment). In the United
States, more flexible wages assure more jobs, but at the cost of soaring
inequality and growing poverty. Both Americans and Europeans suffer from
a Faustian bargain: Americans with their high rate of job creation
alongside their "working poor"; Europeans with their government-protected
jobs alongside a growing "leisure class." Despite capitalism's roots in
private property, little thought has yet been given to reengineering free
enterprise to make it possible for more people to participate as
capitalists.
The second crack: environmental hazards continue to mount. For
example, the market-driven search for "cheap" energy has left radioactive
waste worldwide, creating health and genetic dangers that will last for
millennia. The cost of hydrocarbon-fueled development has resulted in 1.3
billion people breathing air below the minimum standard considered
acceptable by the World Health Organization. None of the largest twenty
cities in the world meet international clean-air standards. The
environment will come under even greater assault as industrialization
continues in the Asian Tigers and as China's development hastens resource
consumption among its 1.2 billion people. Similar costs accompany the
spread of industrial-scale farming and modern production techniques that
contaminate aquifers, degrade watersheds, waste precious topsoil and
imperil rivers and oceans with the runoff of agricultural chemicals.
These two cracks are destined to widen if ownership continues to
become ever more institutionalized, concentrated and disconnected--and if financial
capital continues to become ever more directed solely "by the numbers" (i.e.,
to the lowest-cost, highest-return production). Because the broader
impact of investment decisions typically lie in a faraway part of some
larger system, today's finance-dominated capitalism is limited in its
ability to learn from those consequences. The impact often is too
distant in both place and time. Precisely because the economy lacks a way
to incorporate more personalized, localized, genuinely humanized
feedback, Adam Smith's vision of a seamless, self-designed system has
begun to fray. As yet, there is no countervailing signaling system
capable of ensuring that capitalism is sufficiently well informed except
in a limited, financially myopic manner.
Policymakers are searching for a comprehensive "design science"
capable of organizing economic activity in a way that both promotes human
well-being and reflects sound ecological, ethical and fiscal principles.
Today's finance-dominated free enterprise is simply incapable of
detecting, much less responding to, those self-correcting signals for
which Adam Smith envisioned the market so well suited. Smith could not
have foreseen how financial capital, the lifeblood of capitalism, would
become both (a) concentrated in so few hands and (b) disconnected from
the concerns of those whose lives it affects.
Happily, private ownership is uniquely well suited to provide today's
missing "connectivity." Why? Because at their core, property rights
operate as a signaling system, connecting people to their economy in a
way that enables them to register their personal concerns so that free
enterprise performs in a genuinely people-responsive fashion. That, in a
nutshell, is the premise behind The Ownership Solution.
A Sustainable Capitalism Requires a People-ized Signaling System
At present, free enterprise responds to three types of feedback:
* Product pricing. Consumers "vote" for the best quality at the best price.
* Share pricing. Capital markets "vote" by directing investment capital to
those firms with the best financial returns.
* Corporate governance. This feedback is provided both by hands-on
managers and by the monitoring of those managers by boards of directors who,
in turn, are voted in or out of office by shareholders.
As we shall see, each of these signals has significant limitations.
Yet each could be improved if the underlying ownership pattern were more
participatory. As Smith envisioned, pricing serves as free enterprise's
dominant "feedback loop"--both product pricing and the prices at which a
company's shares trade hands in the marketplace. Consumers have long
assumed that the price of a product includes the full cost of its
production plus a profit. Similarly, shareholders assume that share
prices reflect the company's success in selling products on a profitable
basis. Yet neither assumption may be true where, for example, a company
treats the environment as a cost-free subsidy.
Environmental costs are often imposed neither on the customer (through
higher product prices) nor on shareholders (through lower share values)
but on the public in the form of reduced air quality, increased needs for
health care, depleted stocks of natural resources (clean water, fishes,
forests, etc.) and a poisonous and depleted legacy for future
generations. Even the notion of "profit" may be illusory where private
gain is generated by shifting such costs to the public. When free
enterprise signals us that the invaluable (breathable air, drinkable
water) lacks value, then our feedback system is flawed. Further, when
product costs show up not as a business expense but as a social cost
(pollution, illness and such), this flaw undermines free enterprise by
ensuring higher taxes (for environmental cleanup, health care, etc.),
more intrusive government regulation and, eventually, less consumer
purchasing power.
Further, it is impossible to "cost" certain types of environmental
damage, How does one set a price on lumber when its harvesting destroys
a centuries-old stand of virgin forest? Or cost the use if industrial
chemicals when their disposal damages an aquifer? Or do a cost-benefit
analysis on the use of chemicals that disrupt the endocrine system? Or
put a price tag on the enhanced likelihood of childhood cancer? Such
questions raise both commercial and ethical concerns.
Microbiologist Theo Colborn documents five hundred measurable
chemicals in our bodies that were never in anyone's body before the
1920s, including a range of endocrine-disrupting chemicals (EDCs)
associated with a litany of adverse health effects, including weakened
immune systems, reproductive problems, metabolic maladies and functional
deficits in intelligence, sexual function and behavior. As explained by
Michael Lerner, president of Commonweal, a health and environmental
research institute: "Before EDCs, we used to worry most about toxic
chemicals' increased cancer risk. The higher the dosage/exposure, the
greater the cancer risk. The new research shows that EDCs have a wide
range of serious effects beyond cancer; that they cause these effects at
infinitely lower levels than are necessary to cause cancer; that these
effects are fundamentally intergenerational (the health effects are in
our children and grandchildren)."
Lastly, experience suggests that the current feedback between
directors and managers often fails to provide the oversight needed to
protect either the financial interests of shareholders or the personal
interests of "stakeholders"--those who are put at risk by the company's
activities but have no voice. Although stockholders, at least, have
ownership rights (ineffective though they may be), stakeholders typically
lack any property right through which they can either communicate their
concerns or pursue corrective action.
What free enterprise requires is another signaling mechanism. The feedback
conveyed by prices is essential, but it's insufficient to meet even the most
rudimentary standards of sustainability. Further, as it creature of law,
the corporate entity's "license to operate" is put at risk when
decisions affecting a broad base of stakeholders are reserved solely for
shareholders--who may not even reside in the community where the effects
are felt. In the constant balancing of the interests of stockholders and
stakeholders, the solution is often regulation or litigation. I suggest
that the solution may lie in a more inclusive style of feedback-intensive
decision-making, one that takes into account the concerns of both
shareholders and stakeholders.
Capitalism Needs More "Up-Close" Capitalists
While that may sound reasonable in the abstract, what does it mean in
operation? Consider, for instance, the case of a power-generating
facility organized as an investor-owned utility with rates set by a
public utility commission. Because investors are assured a minimum
return, these companies are seen as prudent blue-chip investments favored
by institutional investors. Consequently, a power utility's shareholders
commonly reside far from the community where the physical impact of its
operations are felt. Thus, if the company becomes an environmental
scoundrel, the most a local consumer can do is complain--to the company,
to the public utility commission, to a local politician--an indirect,
after-the-fact and, at best, tenuous form of feedback.
However, that company could be financially reengineered so that a
portion of its shares are owned by its consumers and its employees.
Converting those stakeholders into shareholders could change things. For
instance, where dissatisfied local residents now depend on a circuitous
feedback system to register their concerns, an ownership stake would
transform them from concerned (but disconnected) stakeholders into
property-empowered owners. Even if local consumers and employees owned
only a small quantity of the utility's total shares, this qualitative
change in the composition of that ownership could transform the company's
capacity to anticipate and respond to legitimate local concerns.
As an example of the benefits of such "up-close capitalism," Nobel
laureate economist Myron Scholes touts the positive effect that employee
stock ownership can have on corporate decision-making. In his view, such
"inside" ownership improves performance both directly (by encouraging
insider challenges to poorly conceived management decisions) and
indirectly--by influencing managers who know that the firm's owners are
now working among them. Similarly, by including a component of consumer
ownership, the utility's managers (and their families) would live among
shareholders who are also neighbors, schoolmates and teammates. Such a
community-focused ownership stake could change the quality of business
relationships across a broad spectrum because local, up-close capitalists
have more at stake than do remote investors, They are also more likely to
raise a hue and cry when the company makes an environmental misstep (or
is about to make nor). Dumping solvents into the local watershed, for
instance, looks very different from up close--when it's your family, not
just your financial return, that's at risk.
If a Little Capitalism Is So Good, Why Not a Lot?
What contemporary capitalism needs most is to be consistent with itself.
If the private ownership of capital is a "public good" worthy of
promotion and protection, then surely the nation will be much improved as
more people gain an opportunity to directly experience just how good
ownership can be. That will happen only when the culture underlying
capitalism includes as a goal the creation of a free enterprise broadly
populated with capitalists.
The intentional engineering of up-close ownership patterns is
something new for modern-day capitalism. However, the deliberate creation
of feedback systems is nothing new. Democracies enjoy popular support for
the very reason that they are engineered feedback systems. Voting
provides a way for the populace to "talk back" to the system, though
opinions vary regarding how well the system listens. Both pricing and
voting reflect a preference for "self-designed" systems based on personal
preference. "The true case for the market mechanism," Financial Times
columnist Sam Brittan argues, "is that it is a decentralized and
non-dictatorial method of conveying information, reacting to change and
fostering innovation."
Both Adam Smith and Thomas Jefferson proposed radically decentralized
systems, along with a centralized government strong enough to ensure that
decentralization. That paradox continues to this day. Winston Churchill
aptly cautioned that democracy is "the worst form of government, except
for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." The
same could be said of free enterprise. For relieving poverty and
protecting personal freedoms, market-based democracies are a major
improvement on state-controlled systems. In large part, that's because
command economies fail to tap that very personal feedback that fuels the
dynamism, responsiveness, robustness and, yes, the messiness of markets.
In the United States, the political foundation of free enterprise is
based on what Alexander Hamilton described in The Federalist Papers as a
"commercial republic." The goal was to encourage an environment of free
economic activity as a way to counteract the erosive influences of envy,
class division and the tyranny of the majority. In a similar vein, Adam
Smith saw commercial activity as the engine fueling the ever-widening
prosperity that democracies require for their popular support. Worldwide,
the resulting "capitalism" now takes many different forms, reflecting the
many cultures in which it arose." Individualistic, American-style
capitalism is very different from that
of communitarian Japan, which differs from that of corporatized Germany,
egalitarian Sweden or doctrinaire Singapore. Yet each, to varying
degrees, creates wealth--capitalism's primary practical goal. Each of
these capitalisms also shares a common challenge: how to institutionalize
a system that generates reliable, people-responsive feedback on a
sustained day-to-day basis.
That, in turn, requires some attention to social engineering. I
propose that societal feedback grounded in broad-based, up-close
ownership is not only desirable but also feasible, affordable and perhaps
even essential. However, without a sustained initiative by leaders in
both the private and the public sector, the bulk of capitalism's
financing will continue to flow through a highly exclusionary,
ownership-concentrating "closed system of finance," which I will describe
in Chapter 3.
Modern-day free enterprise has about it an internally corrosive
element because it lacks a sufficiently engaged constituency with a
personal ownership stake. Again, the capital is there and so is the
capitalism; what is clearly missing are the capitalists. The reason for
this low level of ownership participation is, I submit, a design flaw
because it fails to tap the wisdom of the community. That flaw is
traceable to the fact that capitalism is not yet designed to create
capitalists. Instead it remains frozen in time, reliant on antique
financing techniques that retain their very limited turn-of-the-century
purpose: to finance capital. Those dramatically different goals (i.e.,
creating capitalists versus simply financing capital) require a conscious
choice if they are to be combined. And combined they must be. A genuinely
sustainable capitalism must be engineered so that, by its very
operations, it steadily expands the ranks of those who can rightly be
called capitalists.
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