PREMIUM SEARCH Search by job title, geography and build a list of executive contacts
In early September -- days before the terrorist strikes in New York and Washington, D.C. -- Robert Blackwill, U.S. ambassador to India, visited Bombay, India's commercial capital. There he addressed an elite group of business leaders and journalists on the need for forging closer ties with India as an ally and partner. "Gone are the off-putting days of Indo-U.S. relations," Blackwill declared. The audience cheered. The relationship, Blackwill added, should stress not just liberalized trade and support for economic reforms but a new partnership against terrorism, as "the international terrorist Osama bin Laden calls for a holy war against America and India in the same breath."
With the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., on Sept. 11, and impoverished Afghanistan's Taliban leaders calling for a jihad against the U.S., the atmosphere on the subcontinent is now almost electric. After the attacks, India immediately offered Washington its complete cooperation -- an overture of friendship after years of friction between the two nations. Now you can almost feel Indians thinking: "See how the Pakistanis have lent the terrorists support all these years against us, and now against you, mighty America."
LOGICAL CHOICE. Little wonder, then, that many Indians now feel slighted that President Bush didn't immediately call India's leaders for consultation, despite all their offers of assistance. Instead, his first overtures were to India's perennial rival and America's old ally, Pakistan.
For India, it was a slap in the face. It's the old U.S. foreign policy trick -- mixing pragmatism with opportunism. Just as Indo-U.S. relations were beginning to improve, the friendship may again be in jeopardy. "The U.S. has a good record of going with whoever suits its interests more," says Kanti Bajpai, professor of international affairs at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. "It will look at the first enemy first, even if it means supping with the devil."
Practically, of course, the best hope of hitting the Taliban is through Pakistan. India, with its Hindu-dominated, Bharatiya Janata Party-led government, remains a fragile democracy that takes ages to reach a consensus about anything. As a predominantly Hindu nation, India simply can't contribute as much in this situation as an Islamic nation like Pakistan, especially in the Arab world. And Pakistan is ruled not by a
bearded mullah but by a dog-loving, nattily uniformed general perceived as a moderate. It's a sharp contrast to Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India's shuffling, poetry-spouting, 77-year-old Prime Minister.
EXPENSIVE ALLY. And what a deal Musharraf is reported to have demanded of the U.S. in return for his support: a $30 billion aid and bailout package for his ravaged economy, easing of U.S. trade sanctions imposed on Pakistan in 1998, assurances that India and Israel would be excluded from Pakistani-based operations against the Taliban, and a pledge that the U.S. will seek to put an end to the unrest in Kashmir, territory that both Pakistan and India claim as sovereign territory.
There came immediate howls from New Delhi. Blackwill quickly huddled with Jaswant Singh, India's Foreign and Defense Minister, denying that any such deal had been struck and assuring him that Kashmir would not be used by the Americans as a bargaining chip. But many Indians had to admit that Musharraf's negotiating ploy was clever. "Pakistan looks good," says Subir Gokarn, chief economist at the National Centre for Applied Economic Research in New Delhi, who adds: "It's cut the feet from under India's foreign policy."
Just what deals have been struck between the U.S. and Pakistan remain a mystery. Musharraf will probably get a bailout package like the one the Egyptians received after their first meeting with the Israelis at Camp David in the '70s. Egypt has not looked back since -- though troubled by fundamentalist Muslim terrorists, Egypt has grown into one of the world's most moderate Islamic states.
PAKISTAN'S POVERTY. Musharraf and Pakistan need the money badly, and India shouldn't begrudge Pakistan a bailout. After all, a $30 billion aid package could make the difference between a dangerous neighbor and one that could contribute to a growing regional prosperity. An impoverished Pakistan with a nuclear bomb -- and a history of border wars and hostility with India -- is far more dangerous to India's security. And U.S. intervention would conceivably help counteract the effects of Muslim extremism in parts of disputed Kashmir, where extremist groups are demanding that young women wear the veil -- or have acid thrown on their faces.
But make no mistake: Many Pakistanis are worried. "The U.S. will come and bomb and seek its retribution, but they will go away, and we will be left with the scars," says one Pakistani privately. The Afghans, it is feared, will then turn on Pakistan: "They are cunning and merciless, and we are afraid."
The U.S., in addition to updating its old alliance with Pakistan, would be wise to take a larger view of its engagement in central Asia -- and not forget India. Remember, it was Pakistan that aided and abetted the establishment of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan and India have quietly been building closer ties with China, a rival power whose interests the U.S. doesn't always share. When the looming war is over, real bridges will still need to be built between India and the U.S. -- two democracies standing against terrorism, and for prosperity.
Kripalani is India bureau chief for BusinessWeek Edited by Douglas Harbrecht
Get BusinessWeek directly on your desktop with our RSS feeds.
Add BusinessWeek news to your Web site with our headline feed.
Click to buy an e-print or reprint of a BusinessWeek or BusinessWeek Online story or video.
To subscribe online to BusinessWeek magazine, please click here.
Copyright 2001 , by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved.
Printer-Friendly Version
