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Each of these entities contributed to my education. I was learning quickly and we were making progress, but we still needed to reach a larger audience both inside and outside Russia. It was time to go on the offensive. The Group of Eight (seven by my count!) held a summit in St. Petersburg in the summer of 2006, and the leaders and media of the free world would be in Russia. It provided a golden opportunity to unite and also to get our message out.
We organized a convention in Moscow, an international conference that brought activists from all over Russia to share ideas and support. We also invited the international media and speakers from all over the world who were not afraid to speak strongly for democracy in the shadow of the Kremlin. My All-Russia Civil Congress cochairs and I wrote countless letters of invitation, calling in favors and twisting arms when necessary. Eventually many prominent figures contributed statements of support, although few G-8 administrations had the courage to openly endorse us. We titled our event the Other Russia Conference, so named to tell the world that the stable, democratic Russia Putin presented was not reality.
We knew we had achieved significant progress when the administration made efforts to harass us at every turn. (If this is truly a measure of success, I should be proud that the humble UCF offices were raided by security forces this month, a few days prior to our December 16 march in Moscow.) The Other Russia movement has united the Russian opposition, and although our situation is still precarious, we have succeeded in forcefully promoting ourselves into an important piece on the political chessboard.
The development of the Russian opposition has occurred in parallel with my own evolution as a political thinker. The United Civil Front added political clout to the concept of the All-Russia Civil Congress. It all finally came together, literally and figuratively, in the Other Russia. As unfavorable as our position may still be, my evaluation of our opponents' forces discovered that they are not without their own weaknesses. Unlike the old Soviet regime, this ruling elite has a great deal at stake outside Russia. Their fortunes are in banks, stock markets, real estate, and football teams, predominantly foreign. This means they are vulnerable to external pressure. They literally cannot afford the cutting of ties that would come with open hostility between an increasingly dictatorial Russia and the West.
So far, however, it has been difficult to convince the so-called leaders of the free world and the free press to bring such pressure to bear. Putin uses Russia's energy wealth as a cudgel, and Europe's leaders meekly fall in line. Thus the third element of my strategy has been to expose this hypocrisy in as many editorial pages as I can reach. This plan is not so shortsighted as to not keep in mind the potential consequences. It is essential to maintain our coalition because if the increasingly shaky Putin regime collapses due to internal conflict, it could lead to total chaos. It is worth remembering that just fifteen years ago the mighty Soviet regime disintegrated, much to the surprise of Western intelligence agencies. We have to always look ahead enough moves to be well prepared, even for victory!