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What in the world is going on? At a press conference at his ranch in Crawford, Tex., the other day, President Bush sounded downright conciliatory when talk turned to Iraq. Heck, he was perfectly willing to consult with Congress and foreign leaders about his plans for Baghdad, he told reporters. And all options remained on the table.
Then on Aug. 26, Vice-President Dick Cheney lashed out at Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein in such strong terms that you could almost hear the B-2s revving their engines for the first bombing run. And Cheney was so dismissive of other options, such as weapons inspections, that war seemed the only real possibility.
GOOD COP, BAD COP. The very next day, Bush met with Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to Washington, and once again tried to put a diplomatic face on U.S. policy toward Iraq. The President sweet-talked the Saudis, who are appalled at the prospect of an attack on Iraq.
So what's with the good cop-bad cop routine? A dandy question -- and one that has to be answered on several different levels. Let's take a look:
It has been eight months since Bush gave his speech identifying an "Axis of Evil," yet he has done precious little about the supposedly urgent threat from Saddam. If time isn't on America's side and the Iraqi dictator is rushing forward with the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction that he intends to unleash upon the world, as Bush and Cheney say, why isn't the U.S. moving faster?
One reason is that the Administration has had its hands full with the war on terrorism elsewhere. "They had to make sure al Qaeda was thoroughly smashed in Afghanistan," notes Patrick Clawson, deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
THE NO. 1 ISSUE. While Kabul now shows semblance of stability, with reports that the Taliban and al Qaeda are regrouping, that may not last. Administration insiders are sensitive to concerns raised by Republicans such as Brent Scowcroft that the Bush team must set priorities and that an Iraq venture should not distract them from the No. 1 issue: stopping terrorism. The betting in Washington is that terrorism will continue to be the top priority.
If al Qaeda fails to mark the anniversary of September 11 with another bold attack, however, it may be taken as evidence that the campaign is succeeding, and top Administration officials may push to focus more on other issues, such as Iraq.
Despite caricatures of Bush Administration hardliners as damn-the-torpedoes, full-steam-ahead types, they really are a cautious bunch when it comes to taking action. Take Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. He's one of the more ardent advocates of regime change in Iraq. Yet he's perhaps the most reflective -- as opposed to reflexive -- person in the Administration. Even those who disagree with him say he's thoughtful to a fault, taking an inordinate amount of time to figure out the second and third order of consequences for actions.
SO MANY QUESTIONS. For an Iraq endeavor, that would require a lot of time and energy. For starters, officials have to figure out whether an Afghanistan-style operation or a Desert Storm operation would be more effective in Iraq. Something in between the two may be the most viable option -- and finding the right balance weighs heavily on Team Bush.
Other key issues to ponder: the development status and potential use of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, the prospects for bloody urban warfare, and the nature of the post-Saddam environment. Would empowering Iraqi Kurds endanger Turkey, a key ally with a restless Kurdish minority? Would Iran make common cause with Iraqi Shiites? How does the U.S. limit damage to Iraq's oil infrastructure, which will be critical to any rebuilding of the country after Saddam?
Crafting game plans that minimize the military, diplomatic, and political costs of a military operation is daunting. This would take a long time even if there were no war on terrorism.
INTERNAL BATTLES. These debates rage at several levels -- and not just in the Cabinet room of the White House. The Army is clearly the most vigorous opponent of an attack -- perhaps because it's likely to be left on the sidelines until the nation-building part of the mission. Air Force pilots have been enforcing the no-fly zone over parts of Iraq for years and feel as if they own the territory. The Marines are most likely to do the dirty work in urban areas and have been training for this mission far more than the Army.
With access to nearby bases in doubt, Navy carriers would play a major role in any air campaign. And with Iraq unlikely to amass tanks, as it did in Desert Storm, the need for a large-scale attack by the Army is questionable. So any military action might show the Army's irrelevance to this kind of fighting.
The Khaki Resistance highlights another fact of Pentagon life these days: the deep mistrust the uniforms have for civilian leaders, according to several sources. It started with grumblings that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld didn't consult enough with the generals and admirals when he first assumed command of the Pentagon -- at least not enough to satisfy them.
LANDING A "LEFT HOOK." The distrust may go in both directions. Some on the Bush team who served in the Administration of the President's father 10 years go rejected the Army's initial plans for Operation Desert Storm. It was a kind of Woody Hayes, Ohio State football strategy -- gain three yards in a cloud of dust and then just keep moving toward Baghdad.
Instead, the civilians argued for the successful "left hook" strategy, which the military eventually embraced. This time around, the initial battle plan again lacked creativity, in the view of these returnees, and it was tossed back.
Then there's the Striped Pants Brigade-multilateralist diplomats at the State Dept. who favor coalition-building among U.S. allies over the friends-be-damned, hit-Saddam-hard strategy favored by the Defense Dept.'s unilateralists and the Vice-President.
TACTICAL ADVANTAGE. It's unclear how much of this is game-playing. Even a unilateralist like Rumsfeld believes that if the U.S. leads, others will follow, and what may look like a lonely course at first won't be in the end. And indeed, the unilateralist approach has a tactical advantage.
If the U.S. were desperate for approval of a U.N. Security Council resolution before it went into Iraq, it would give Russia and China leverage so they could wrest concessions for their favorable vote. But if the U.S. continues to make clear that it will move ahead regardless of any Security Council vote, Russia's and China's bargaining power all but disappears. The U.S. could get the resolution it wants without giving much away.
To be sure, the slow, meandering process the Administration has undertaken isn't pretty to watch. The more time Bush puts between his State of the Union address declaring Iraq part of the Axis of Evil and taking action against Saddam, the more he risks looking like a blowhard.
WORK IN PROGRESS. In retrospect, perhaps he should have waited to take a public hardline on Saddam until Afghanistan was clearly under control. But Clawson argues that his Axis speech got the Pentagon and State Dept. moving, for it indicated Bush was serious. And planning does take time.
Keep this in mind, too: Despite the gallons of ink that have been spilled on the subject of an Iraqi invasion, the plan is likely still very much a work in progress. Too many things can still happen that could change how it'll turn out. A lot of pundits foresaw the end of the world if the U.S. attacked Afghanistan or pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. We're all still here. I suspect we all will be whatever happens in Iraq, too.
Crock covers national security and foreign affairs for BusinessWeek from Washington. Follow his views in Affairs of State twice a month, only on BusinessWeek Online Edited by Douglas Harbrecht
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