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A TALK WITH SUN'S MICHAEL MORRISMichael H. Morris is vice-president and general counsel for Sun Microsystems Inc. He oversees a separate legal battle with Microsoft, in which Sun contends Microsoft changed Sun's Java software in breach of their contract. On May 12, Sun filed new motions asking that Microsoft ship Sun's version of Java with Windows 98. Morris hopes Sun's and the Justice Dept.'s cases will help open up competition in the computer industry. He spoke to Business Week's Robert D. Hof on the recent antitrust developments.
Q: What do you think of the decision?
Q: Did the lawsuit surprise you? It seemed to me all along that any settlement would be bad. I could not imagine Microsoft agreeing to settle a case on terms that would touch upon its monopoly power. The only question was whether the states and the DOJ would stand fast. That's what we got.
Q: Are the particular remedies appropriate? One interesting question is the degree to which, if those remedies go into effect, the original equipment manufacturers [personal computer makers] will exercise their freedom. I think it's a reasonable thing to be a little skeptical, because of their reaction to the [1995] consent decree order. What the judge said was that Microsoft had to offer the OEMs either Windows 95 without a browser or Windows 95 with a browser. And of course, they all took Windows 95 with a browser. One of the reasons they did that was that they know their consumers expect to have Internet browsing capability these days. But I think the other reason was they live in fear and intimidation of Microsoft. That hasn't changed. Their first reaction is going to be absolute caution, because they are scared to death of what Microsoft can do to them if they displease them.
Q: So is the Justice Dept. too late here?
In a normal environment, they would jump at that chance. This is not a normal environment. It's impossible to overestimate how much fear and intimidation there is in the OEM community with respect to Microsoft. It's terrible.
Q: Should Justice do anything else?
Q: Do you think that Justice will find more evidence of wrongdoing in the discovery phase, or that Microsoft will settle? We also don't know what discovery will hold. We don't even know all the documents the government currently has at its disposal. They hinted at some of them in the complaint and in Joel Klein's press conference. But I gotta believe they have a lot of stuff there. The only thing that might change Microsoft's mind is if the revelation of more and more information about their business practices has begun to turn the public decisively against them. Then they might change their tune and do the right thing.
Q: Microsoft contends it should be able to innovate by including new capabilities in the operating system. Is that valid, or does a company with that much dominance have to play by different rules?
Q: Except the browser. Secondly, it's a type of technology that was offered not first by Microsoft, but by Netscape, and was highly successful. It was only after this bundling strategy and restrictive licenses that Microsoft imposed on the OEMs took effect that Netscape's market share began to drop. And of course, it was offered by Microsoft as a separate product for two, three years before they attempted to "fully integrate" it. So the circumstances regarding the browser are very special and very different. The idea that they're trying to peddle -- which is that the government's response to the browser bundling means that Microsoft can't integrate anything into the operating system going forward -- is patently absurd. The government has never made that claim, doesn't make that claim, won't make that claim. But it's the kind of thing that Microsoft likes to say because it sounds good and, to the uninformed, it may even engender some sympathy. It's pure demagoguery. Their hypocrisy is genuinely towering.
Q: Justice's requirement that Microsoft include Netscape's browser with Windows 98 seems to go beyond what even some supporters of limitations on Microsoft think is justified. Do you think so? So how do you address this harm? It seems to me there are a couple of ways you can do it. You can say to Microsoft, "Look, you can continue to offer Explorer, but consumers ought to have the same opportunity with the same ease of use to get another browser as they do Explorer." Now, how do you do that? One of the ways is to force bundling. The other way is to say, "You guys don't offer a browser. If you're going to offer a browser, it's gotta be separate from the operating system, just as Netscape's currently is, so that the user has to go through the same hassle to get your browser as they do to get Netscape's." That's all the product of Microsoft's egregious behavior. That's the only reason we've come to this pass. They have nobody to blame but themselves.
Q: Justice makes no mention of Java. How does this case bear on Sun's Internet software? The case the government did file at least has an indirect potential effect on Java. To the degree that the remedies get imposed and Netscape gets a better shot at the competitive marketplace, that's good for Java and the Java community. Netscape has been the principal distribution channel for compatible, standard Java technology.
Q: Will the issues raised in the Justice case help Java in any way? I don't know that any of the particular issues that the government or the state AGs have raised are going to be helpful or harmful in our case. Our case is going to stand or fall on its own merits. In the PC space, we don't have a dog in that fight. The real effect is that the case can lift this dead hand of monopoly from the industry as a whole.
Q: Will what the Justice Dept. has done change how and where Sun competes going forward?
Q: How has Sun been involved in the case?
Q: What will be the impact of this decision on the computer industry?
Q: So you aren't worried the government will get too heavy-handed?
Q: What can Justice or Microsoft's opponents do to counter its public-relations fight against the decision?
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Updated May 22, 1998 by bwwebmaster
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